OEXA 83-1427/1
OCA ER 3109-83

17 August 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [redacted] STAT
Deputy Director, Public Affairs Office

SUBJECT: Your Remarks to Westminster College

1. Action Requested: Please review attached draft of talking points for your address to Westminster College; STAT provide comments to [redacted] PAO.

2. Background: You will be speaking as the John Findley Green Foundation lecturer at Westminster College on STAT 29 October. The audience will include President [redacted] the Board of Trustees, students, parents, and STAT faculty. The Honorable Clare Booth Luce will also attend. Sir Winston Churchill, accompanied by President Harry S. Truman, delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech at the College. Previous lecturers are Presidents Truman and Ford, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Reinhold Niebuhr, Lord C. P. Snow, Edward Heath, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

Attached are talking points which will provide the basis of a speech. Your comments will help us refine the text to your satisfaction.

STAT [redacted]

Charles E. Wilson

Attachments

PAO/[redacted]/16 Aug 83/x7676 STAT
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--[redacted] honored guests, teachers, parents STAT
and students of Westminster College. Thank you for asking me here to Fulton. I am honored to be speaking where the great Winston Churchill spoke. I am an admirer of Mr. Churchill and believe much of what he had to say almost four decades ago would still be beneficial for us to ponder today.

--Misconceptions abound about intelligence. Being at Westminster College reminds me how much the CIA resembles a university. The CIA has more Ph.Ds than any other government agency. Most of our people spend their time in libraries rather than in the smokey Singapore bars the movies love to depict. So I feel very much at home here.

--I believe it is fitting that I stand before you today at the alma mater of the man, President Truman, who affixed his signature to the National Security Act of 1947, thereby creating the Central Intelligence Agency.

--President Truman, as many of you are aware, listened intently as Winston Churchill made his impassioned "Iron Curtain" speech here in 1946. These two great leaders were well acquainted with what Churchill called the "two great marauders of our time" -- <u>war</u> and <u>tyranny</u>. They desired, as we do today, to prevent the former without resort to the latter.

--But the <u>desire for peace does not guarantee peace</u>.

--I do not propose to tell such an intelligent audience of the relative merits of democracy as opposed to

totalitarianism. Nor do I plan to belabor you with a quantitative analysis of the relative military strengths of the Soviet Union as compared to the United States. Such information is available in great abundance in the daily press and I see little need to reiterate it here. What is necessary is some sort of national consensus on the meaning of these numbers.

--What we all seem to neglect when we are confronted with and debate these calculations is the political and historical context within which they occur. It is too simple to say that the Russians enjoy a four-to-one advantage in tanks over NATO forces; that does not explain why this competition exists and why it will be with us for some time.

--Russia never was and the Soviet Union is not now a European nation. We must discard the notion that there is a frustrated libertarian locked within the soul of every Soviet citizen. Neither the most backward and disaffected Russian peasant nor the most cultured and educated Party Secretary has a counterpart in the West.

--We cannot apply our own assumptions to a society with a radically-different history, one of protracted armed struggle against a series of ferocious invaders; a society rooted in ideas, older than Marxism and Bolshevism, of an omnipotent state and the necessary subservience of the individual to this state. In old Russia, military service as it is today was

obligatory and permanent.

--What then are the forces that have formed Ivan's view of his government? A history of struggle for national survival, an absolute Tsar who only at the very end shared power with anyone, isolation from and fear of the West.

--But what does all this mean for us in the United States?

--The important thing ultimately is not whether we approve or disapprove of the Soviet society but how much we understand its leaders and their goals.

--In many senses, we are a young, inexperienced nation. Despite the trauma of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iran, I am convinced we retain a streak of idealistic innocence.

--But America has assumed, by default really, the terrible burdens of world leadership. With this comes the duty, the responsibility, of appraising the world with a steely and discerning eye.

--To many of our citizens, it seems implausible that a nation like the Soviet Union could have aspirations beyond ensuring the stability of the international system. Yet the Soviets today are not committed to world stability; they are not a status quo power. To believe otherwise is to build our foreign policy on fantasy.

--What does the Soviet Union want? Churchill tried to answer this question here in Fulton nearly 40 years ago when he said, "What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines." He was right.

--But to say that the Soviets are expansionist is not to paint a vulgar caricature of a blueprint for world conquest. We need to recognize, however, that the Soviets, including Yuri Andropov -- who the press in a fit of wishfulness once described as a "closet liberal" -- will use maximum prudence with maximum opportunism to increase their power and influence.

--The responsibility I've spoken of rests with every American citizen. In a democracy, public policy cannot be formulated and sustained without the solid support of the electorate. Yet until an avoidable crisis is upon us, we have historically failed to deal with it. A determination to appraise the world with clarity and foresight must become a part of out national consciousness if we are to avoid further debacles.

--We cannot continually give our adversaries the benefit of the doubt until we have painted ourselves into a corner with only two alternatives: war or surrender of national will and purpose. A democratic people understand readily black and white issues such as war and peace . In this day and age of nebulous gray, we must be equally clear and determined about what our interests and strategies should be.

--If our nation is to survive and prosper, we must take up the political struggle which is now going on in the hinterlands of the world. I believe the Third World is America's most vulnerable flank. The Third World now buys 40% of our exports and supplies much of the world's strategic raw materials; less developed nations sit astride many of the globe's strategic waterways. Little wonder these countries are magnets for Soviet expansion.

--America's message of democracy to developing nations is being drowned out by a steady drumbeat of beguiling Marxist-Leninist ideology promising economic and political quick-fixes.

--The Soviet's work through other countries such as Cuba, Libya, East Germany, and Nicaragua. Their surrogates play an obvious role in insurgency while the Kremlin stands in the shadows providing money, propaganda, training, and direction.

--Only where a vacuum exists on their borders and the risk of American intervention is low -- as in Afghanistan -- are the Soviets willing to use their own forces.

--We need as a nation to face up to the fact that this low-profile, low-risk Soviet strategy has worked in places such as Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, Grenada, and now threatens an elected popular government in El Salvador.

--It is a particularly difficult strategy for an open democratic society like ours to counter. Why? Because any direct response by the West can be conveniently condemned as imperialistic.

--It is no coincidence that the Soviets became more active in the Third World in the mid-1970s after our expulsion from Vietnam. They concluded then that the U.S. would not compete militarily in the Third World. Furthermore, in the aftermath of Vietnam they rightly assessed that they could exploit the legitimate differences within this country about what the U.S. response to aggression and insurgency should be. Notice that Castro's public statement on the joint U.S. - Honduran military exercises was to compare them ridiculously with Vietnam.

--I keep returning to the theme of Vietnam because I believe its specter still haunts this nation. Perhaps we will never reconcile the various views and opinions concerning the necessity and legitimacy of that war. We shall have to learn to live together with our differences and our memories of the tragic conflict.

--But let us not learn the wrong lesson from Vietnam. The lesson is <u>not</u> that we should <u>never</u> protect our national interests or stand up to aggression.

--I have heard young people say there is nothing worth fighting for, that there are only cosmetic differences between

the United States and the Soviet Union. Their cynicism -- indeed, their naivete -- saddens me. I do not think the people in Poland, the dissidents in Soviet jails and so-called psychiatric hospitals, or the refugees from Southeast Asia would agree. I urge these young people to think for a moment how unique it is in history that so large a portion of the creative minds of a country are in exile.

--But Vietnam does teach us that we must carefully tailor the intensity and duration of our responses to a clear evaluation of our national interests.

--I believe we need a consistent, nonpartisan policy that seeks to counter the Soviet strategy while preventing unprovoked war.

--We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia until they became a problem or were threatened by insurgency and subversion.

--The priority of the Third World in our overall foreign policy must be raised and sustained. The Executive Branch must do more to educate the public, the press, the Congress, and Third World governments about Soviet strategy.

--The U.S. must establish priorities in major commitments. President Nixon wanted to rely on key regional states as bulwarks for stability and peace. There are some dangers in this approach but it is generally sensible.

--We must ask ourselves that if our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? We should choose ahead of time and in consultation with key members of committees of Congress and in open, public debates so that the President has the necessary support at crucial moments.

--Great losing battles for foreign military sales and economic assistance, played out on the world stage at critical times, represent devastating setbacks for the U.S. and propaganda fodder for our adversaries.

--We must be prepared to demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is required by our own principles. Moreover, we have to be willing to talk bluntly to those we would help about issues such as land reform and corruption. These are issues Third World countries must address in order to block foreign exploitation of their problems. We need to show how the Soviets have exploited such vulnerabilities to make clear we aren't preaching out of cultural arrogance but are making recommendations based on experience.

--We need to be ready to help our friends defend themselves by training them in counterinsurgency tactics, upgrading their communications, mobility, and intelligence services. We need changes in our foreign-military-sales laws to permit the U.S. to provide arms more quickly. We also need

to change our military procurement policies so as to have stocks of certain basic kinds of weapons more readily available.

--Above all, we must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the Third World -- private business. Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale economic assistance to the world's disadvantaged. Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote investment in less developed countries.

--Finally, the Executive Branch needs to collaborate more closely in the setting of strategy with key members and committees of Congress. Too often opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost by clashes between the two branches. The independent stand of Congress is a fact of life, and any effort to counter the Soviets in the Third World will fail unless Congress is a party to the Executive's thinking and planning -- all along the way. Support for a Third World policy must be <u>bipartisan</u> and <u>stable</u>.

--Without a sustained, constant policy -- one that transcends inevitable, political change -- we cannot counter the relentless pressure of the Soviets in the Third World. We must seize the initiative, not merely react or wait passively, fearfully, until we are outflanked and out of options. As Mr. Churchill said, "<u>We cannot escape our dangers by recoiling from them.</u>"

--To the students here at Westminster College, I urge you to take time to read and to study history, as well as contemporary events, and to come to your own conclusions regarding the issues I have spoken of today, not necessarily mine, your professors', or the media's.

--Knowledge of the past is the only foundation to measure the present and predict future. Expert, technical knowledge is desirable but is no substitute for a comprehensive grounding in the whole scope of the human story.

--I also recommend some comparative philosophy, politics, and literature in order to understand the dimensions and diversity of the human experience. In intelligence analysis we call these disciplines "atmospherics," and we have learned that they are crucial to our understanding of current events as they affect future choices. You, too, are crucial in helping this nation see clearly the choices that lie ahead of it. I wish you well.

--My thanks once again to [redacted] for inviting me and to all of you for listening. STAT